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a b s t r a c t
The influential role of international treaty secretariats in coordinating bureaucracies across jurisdictional
boundaries has been highlighted in recent years. While we now better understand how their influence
occurs, the field still faces a substantial difficulty in answering the basic quantitative question of “how
influential?” By employing network analysis, we devised and tested a survey to quantify secretariat
influence within an international environmental regime. We applied the survey tool to two trans-
boundary fisheries governance networks in North America and here focus on the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission (GLFC) as our primary case study. The results demonstrate a high ability of treaty secretariat
to influence the management decisions of federal and state/provincial agencies. Primary interview data
collected with the GLFC secretariat staff helps explain this finding. This study advances the recon-
ceptualization of secretariat influence via relational metrics, and offers a way to estimate secretariat
influence despite their typically veiled modes of operation.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The study of international organizations (IOs) and their partic-
ular role in coordinating bureaucracies across jurisdictional
boundaries to realize collective outcomes has become increasingly
prominent in the fields of global environmental politics and public
administration (Bauer, 2006; Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009;
Tallberg et al., 2013; Johnson, 2014; Knill and Bauer, 2016). In
particular, there is a growing body of scholarship on understanding
the role of international treaty secretariats (i.e., administrative
bodies set up to support themultilateral institutional arrangements
of IOs) and how they consequently impact (inter)governmental
policy processes and outcomes (Busch, 2014; Jinnah, 2014; Eckhard
and Ege, 2016; Tallberg et al., 2016). This has been mirrored by a
concurrently developing literature on public management net-
works examining the presence and effectiveness of leadership
exercised through network administrative (or “collaborative”) or-
ganizations. These second-order organizations, composed of
participant network members, bear interorganizational transaction
costs, distribute tasks, and facilitate collaborative processes (Provan
and Milward, 2001; Imperial, 2005; Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos,
2014). In the scholarly field of international relations, the ascen-
dance of the constructivist approach has enabled expanded con-
ceptions of power and authority wielded by treaty secretariats,
greatly beyond the initial frames of state-centred ontology offered
by realists and neoliberals (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 2004;
Barnett and Duvall, 2005). That treaty secretariats do not merely fill
an administrative function within given power structures, but that
they possess agency and autonomy in their own right (at least
partially) to influence and even shape state preferences, has been a
revelation in the field and opened new possibilities for enhancing
the efficacy of global governance (e.g. Jinnah, 2010; Michaelowa
and Michaelowa, 2017). Analysts have usefully identified and
debated the sources of authority for treaty secretariats as well as
the mechanisms and types of influence often observed, despite the
admission that they nevertheless operate under a veil of neutrality
and member state delegation (Depledge, 2007; Biermann and
Siebenhüner, 2009). A number of important explanatory variables
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for the influence of secretariats have subsequently been proposed
to illuminate how they increase influence and why such influence
may vary across organizations. These include the ability to draw on
moral authority and shared worldviews, control of information
flow, and being a holder of institutional memory and specialized
knowledge pertaining to scientific, procedural and diplomatic
expertise (see Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Biermann and
Siebenhüner, 2009).
While constituting what has been previously described as an
energized research field (see Eckhard and Ege, 2016 for a recent
review), there remain important unanswered questions concerning
secretariat influence. For example, how best to ascertain the level of
secretariat influence against that of other actors within an inter-
national regime, such as national and subnational agencies, has not
been sufficiently explored. To the best of our knowledge, no direct
empirical research approach has been provided in the literature to
measure, quantify, and compare secretariat influence. Instead,
determining the extent or reach of influence has mainly relied on
the use of in-depth case studies employing interviews with secre-
tariat staff, participant observation, and reviews of official speeches
and documents to enable process tracing and counterfactual anal-
ysis (i.e. whether there are any changes in policies, institutions,
relationships, and/or norms in the regime, whether these changes
can be attributed to the secretariat's observed mechanisms of in-
fluence, and whether alternative explanations that do not involve
secretariats can be ruled out) (e.g. see Underdal, 2001; Biermann
and Siebenhüner, 2009; Jinnah, 2014). While such an intensive
approach can be suitable for elucidating the causal mechanisms
that help reveal the strategies that secretariats use to exercise in-
fluence, it does not offer a way to assess the fundamental question
of how influential? A large part of this methodological difficulty
stems from the ‘behind the scenes’ character of treaty secretariats,
which often operate through informal and less public channels. For
example, because they do not explicitly announce preferences as
part of their mandate, it is more difficult to estimate and evaluate
their overt intention and therefore isolate their unique influence on
interorganizational policy outcomes.
This study aims to address this research gap by developing and
testing a network-based survey method capable of measuring and
comparing secretariat influence. What we espouse is a relational
methodology which treats influence as an outcome rather than an
attribute. This perspective considers influence to be something that
only materializes when others are connected and affected by one's
action, not when one simply ‘possesses’ it. Method-wise, it builds
on recent studies assessing secretariat influence among a network
of state and non-state organizations using Twitter-derived data to
depict network structure (see J€orgens et al., 2016; Kolleck et al.,
2017). We take this body of work a step further by implementing
an online survey designed to enable a more direct and purposeful
estimation of influence within a given environmental regime. The
case study of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) is pre-
sented below, which comprises a binational treaty secretariat
aimed at facilitating transboundary fisheries governance in the
Great Lakes region of North America. The results demonstrate a
relatively high ability of the GLFC secretariat to influence the
management decisions of federal and state/provincial agencies. We
contextualize this quantitative estimation by analysing primary
interview data collectedwith the GLFC secretariat staff to reveal the
relational origin and persistence of such interorganizational influ-
ence. We highlight two factors e the non-substitutable functions
and convening power of the secretariat. Together, this study offers
an innovative reconceptualization of secretariat influence in terms
of relational metrics with a view to advancing the network-based
understanding of an international environmental regime.
The next section briefly traces the existing methods used to
assess the influence of treaty secretariats. We then describe the
survey method developed to directly assess secretariat influence,
along with a qualitative interview component, and present the case
study in detail. Results are then analysed and discussed, revealing
the level of secretariat influence and providing insight to the key
organizational traits and activities leveraged to generate this
influence.
2. Theory and methodology
2.1. Understanding and measuring secretariat influence
In understanding the influence exerted by international treaty
secretariats and exploring ways to study it, an important observa-
tion has arisen. Because states had agreed to form a treaty and
created a secretariat to administer treaty work by funding it, sec-
retariats are not expected to have a voice of their own, but rather
act as an “international servant”working to fulfil states’ interests in
a neutral and transparent manner. The mandates of these secre-
tariats often tend to emphasize their logistical role while discour-
aging lobbying for any particular policy output or active
participation in the multilateral negotiations themselves
(Depledge, 2005; Busch, 2009). The potential for autonomous in-
fluence therefore challenges a fundamental tenet of how secretar-
iats are supposed to derive legitimacy, i.e., via political neutrality
(Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Mathiason, 2007; Bauer et al., 2012). Yet,
as is well known, many secretariats (particularly in the environ-
ment sphere) perform a suite of authoritative functions, albeit in
the background, that may affect state decisions (e.g. draft agendas,
filter information, fund research, and frame policy ideas). Para-
doxically, secretariat influence stems from this restrained aspect of
secretariat politics, that is, through activities that are often unseen,
informal and obscured (Jinnah, 2014).
Owing to such “veiled” characteristics of secretariats when it
comes to deploying influence, conventional measures of ascer-
taining the extent of influence through qualitative and researcher-
driven techniques (e.g. interviews, observation and document
analysis, as done in Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009; Jinnah, 2014)
have had difficulty generating an explicit picture of who is more
influential and by how much. Particularly, J€orgens et al. (2016, p.
982) notes that attempts at directly understanding hidden prefer-
ences through statements and observed behaviour from staff and
documentation can be biased in one of two opposing directions e
secretariat influence being either inflated or discounted. While
advocacy-oriented administrators may exaggerate the policy im-
pacts the secretariat generates for reputational gains, others are
likely to downplay its effect to preserve an image of impartiality on
which their authority depends (see for example, Bauer, 2009;
Busch, 2009; Jinnah, 2011; Conliffe, 2011). In fact, Jinnah (2014, p.
21) avers that “secretariats often go to great lengths to conceal any
activities that reflect their own political preferences.”
In acknowledging this methodological challenge, J€orgens, Kol-
leck and colleagues took a different approach, aiming to infer in-
fluence from one's relative position or status in the communication
networks that form an international regime (J€orgens et al., 2016;
Kolleck, 2016; Kolleck et al., 2017). In so doing, the concept of in-
fluence was rephrased as the interactive pull through which
behavioural change is induced between a group of actors. Such an
analysis utilizes the broader structure of social relationships or
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linkages that make up a governance network, rather than focusing
on the open statements, resources and strategies of individual
secretariats themselves (Isett et al., 2011; Verweij et al., 2013;
Koliba et al., 2019). Casting political influence in these relational
terms and highlighting its interdependent nature has subsequently
enabled a novel methodological operationalization.
One way of inferring influence from an actor's relational posi-
tion in policy networks (rather than individual preferences or ca-
pacities) involves using social network analysis. For example,
J€orgens and colleagues used Twitter-derived data to explore the
communicative influence of the UN Climate Change secretariat
(under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change) (J€orgens et al., 2016; Kolleck et al., 2017). With vertices
representing Twitter users and edges indicating both ‘mentions’
and ‘retweets’, the authors applied the measures of ‘betweenness
centrality’ and ‘eigenvector centrality’ to identify the most central
Twitter users, thosewhose tweets connect a number of clusters and
thus have the greatest chance at exerting influence. The analyses
not only empirically demonstrated the feasibility of taking a
network-relational approach, but also found that the secretariat
under study occupied a unique and central ‘brokering’ position in
climate change issue-specific policy debates, suggesting a domi-
nant role in affecting and connecting multiple stakeholder groups.
While being innovative, this approach is in its relative infancy.
Moreover, when concerned with ascertaining the extent of inter-
organizational influence, the use of social network analysis via
Twitter data offers limited appeal in at least two ways. First, the
issue-specific communication networks depicted on Twitter are an
oversimplified proxy of the actual professional network underlying
international policy-making. Notwithstanding the brief word limit
on each communication (i.e. each [re]tweet), the Twitter exchange
is one, and likely a minor, dimension of information exchange
taking place in an international treaty regime, with more sub-
stantive and consequential discussions carried out through meet-
ings, phone calls, speeches, formal memos, and informal
conversations that form the suite of verbal and written communi-
cation occurring. J€orgens et al. (2016, p. 986) acknowledges that the
use of Twitter data is more relevant for debates about general
principles of an issue rather than about its technical and political
details (e.g. see Saerbeck et al., 2020 which uses non-Twitter,
original survey data). Secondly, social network analysis does not
measure influence directly, but only infers it from an actor's posi-
tion in a policy network, that is, “a central position of an actor is at
best interpreted as a sign of empowering other actors and facili-
tating coalition-building, rather than direct influence on the policy
outputs of multilateral negotiations” (J€orgens et al., 2016, p. 986).
Hence, it fails to describe the tangible impact of treaty secretariats.
2.2. A direct approach to estimate influence via survey and
interview
Our contribution in this article is consistent with the network-
informed approach described above. The main innovation is that
we develop and utilize a survey to obtain exact data on interorga-
nizational influence. A burgeoning literature on governance net-
works, epistemic communities and ‘post-bureaucratic organizations’
provides an extensive theoretical backdrop (e.g. Heckscher, 1994;
Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Isett et al.,
2011; Hass, 2015; Young, 2017; Koliba et al., 2019). Engaging with
this set of literature has enabled us to consider amore horizontal and
decentralized as well as knowledge-, trust- and communication-
based conceptualization of influence while supporting the design
of a related survey methodology to capture these nuanced interor-
ganizational relations (see Temby et al., 2015; 2017; Song et al.,
2019a, 2019b; Lima et al., 2019 for a progression of earlier work).
Conducting the survey first requires compiling a list of relevant
organizations that comprise a governance network (e.g. [sub]na-
tional government agencies, and treaty secretariats that form part
of IOs). The survey would then begin by asking respondents to
select an organization to which s/he belongs from the list and then
asking to select all the agencies that they communicate with
formally or informally in their professional role. This communica-
tive history forms an essential basis for establishing a “working
relationship”, however banal or sporadic. To determine if and how
much organizations included in the survey (including any treaty
secretariats) exercise influence across the network, the re-
spondents are then prompted to complete the influence question
for all the relationships they specified in the preceding steps. We
consulted Cox and Jacobson's (1973, p. 3) classic definition of in-
fluence, “the modification of one actor's behaviour by another”. Our
operationalization is also consistent with Jinnah (2014, p. 55)'s
concept of ‘moderate’ influence that refers to “a change in practices
not required by changes in official rules or widely adopted norms,”
and similar to the concept of double-loop social learning, consisting
of correcting errors by examining policies (Artmitage et al., 2008).
Furthermore, recent studies of influence within bureaucratic net-
works shows that it occurs differently through formal and informal
channels (Temby et al., 2017; Song et al., 2019b). These differences
were operationalized in the survey, which formulated the following
two variables to measure interorganizational influence:
- How often has communicating with people in the following
organizations through informal channels (e.g. chance conver-
sations, spontaneous meetings, personal notes, emails and
phone calls, drinks after work) led you to make professional
choices or decisions that you would not have otherwise made?
- How often has communicating with people in the following
organizations through formal channels (e.g., committee meet-
ings, memos, official verbal or written business communication)
led you to make professional choices or decisions that you
would not have otherwise made?”
Although respondents represented themselves with self-
identified affiliated organizations, their referents for these ques-
tions were the organizations with which they interact. Because
each respondent is answering these two questions for all the or-
ganizations listed in the survey, the survey generates directional
information about communication and influence on one-to-many
relations. By collating all responses, this survey design permits
capturing the extent of influence across a group of organizations, in
addition to being able to separate the level of influence for each
dyadic relationship. This was the basis for distinguishing IO secre-
tariat influence from that of other organizations, and also being
able to compare it with others.
The key informant interviews conducted with secretariat staff
focused on probing relational explanations of secretariat influence.
According to Bruno Latour (1986), influence is never of one's own
making, but it only materializes through interactions and re-
lationships with other parties, and only in the aftermath of being
conformed to. He stated, “when an actor simply has power [or in-
fluence] nothing happens and s/he is powerless; when, on the other
hand, an actor exerts power it is others who perform the action”
(ibid, p. 264). In other words, nomatter how influential one appears
to be, it remains an illusion until others start to take action in
response, e.g. change one's behaviour or adjust decisions. In this
sense, influence must be treated as a consequence rather than as a
property that causes action. Such theorizing provides an interesting
alternative to the more mechanistic explanations of influence that
delve into the mandate of the secretariat and the resources avail-
able to it, as well as more structural considerations that include the
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problem structure, the polity framework, and the organizational
procedures and cultures (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). We
shed light on this novel perspective by drawing on the case of the
Great Lakes Fishery Commission.
3. Case study
Scholars of North American environmental politics have begun
to view transboundary, multilateral environmental issues as com-
plex problems, where multiple agencies within and between gov-
ernments attempt to collaborate to bring about desired outcomes,
and in which treaty secretariats behave entrepreneurially to
maintain relevance, spotlighting particular problems or serving an
interjurisdictional coordinating role (see Healy et al., 2014;
VanNijnatten and Craik, 2015; Norman, 2015; Temby and Stoett,
2017; Young, 2017; Brooks and Olive, 2018). Several studies have
highlighted the role of IOs and their secretariats within the prolif-
erating number of environmental governance networks. This has
included research on binational fishery commissions (Temby et al.,
2015; Song et al., 2017), the trinational Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation (Simon, 2014; Jinnah and Lindsay, 2015) and
binational boundary water commissions (Clamen and Macfarlane,
2015). However, aside from Jinnah and Lindsay's (2015) study of
NAFTA influence, and Don Munton's (2006, 2007) critical analyses
of Canada-U.S. Air Quality Committee, they have not directly
examined organizational influence. And those that have done so
have used process tracing case studies rather than surveys of
network participants.
3.1. Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC)
The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is a binational commission
comprised of representatives from the United States and Canada
with a mandate to establish “working arrangements” among gov-
ernments (the Great Lakes fall under the jurisdiction of two na-
tions, eight US states, one Canadian province, and several tribes), to
ensure multi-jurisdictional fishery management (GLFC, 2019). Ac-
cording to the website of the GLFC (2019): “The commission
became a focal point for cooperative Great Lakes fishery manage-
ment, though was designed specifically to not supersede existing
state or provincial management authority”. The GLFC was estab-
lished through a binational treaty, the 1954 Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries (Gaden et al., 2013), signed in response to the
severity of the sea lamprey invasion that devastated both the
commercial and recreational fisheries. In 1981, the original Joint
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries was
developed and signed by all major federal, state, provincial and
tribal jurisdictions (updated in 1997) to provide a strategic, though
nonbinding, means through which to manage the Great Lakes
fishery across political boundaries as an ecosystem. The GLFC is
headed by commissioners appointed by each of the two countries
and supported by technical committees as well as Lake Committees
that focus on the lake-specific management of each Great Lake. The
Lake Committee representatives from all five lakes then form the
Council of Lake Committees, representing a unifying body to
address basin-wide issues such as sea lamprey control (GLFC, 2019).
The GLFC secretariat is comprised of approximately 20e25
permanent staff, and is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The GLFC
secretariat has three main tasks, as outlined in the Convention.
Namely, it implements a program of sea lamprey control, co-
ordinates and conducts science, and maintains working relation-
ships with government agencies and other public management
organizations. The sea lamprey control program is the activity for
which the GLFC owes much of its positive reputation. It has been
successful at reducing the presence of the invasive species by 90%
from its peak (GLFC, 2014a); it also uses approximately 75% of the
GLFC's annual budget. In its role as a science coordinator, the GLFC
funds the scientific studies of its choice, publishes summaries of the
current ‘state of scientific knowledge’ in areas of importance, and
communicates research findings to government through a variety
of media outlets (GLFC, 2014b). In maintaining working relation-
ships, the GLFC facilitates meetings between state, provincial, and
federal agencies to share information as well as implements
dispute resolution mechanisms when agreement on fishery policy
cannot be reached.
Fishery commissions such as the GLFC may play an important
role in enhancing transboundary governance capacity, but the
specifics of this role and the degree of their influence have not been
clarified. Moreover, because IO research has tended to focus on a
subset of large, global and well-publicized actors such as the World
Bank and United Nations specialized agencies, smaller treaty sec-
retariats with a more focused remit and a narrower set of state
jurisdictions have not sufficiently entered the empirical base of this
research field (Haftel and Thompson, 2006; Eckhard and Ege, 2016).
Considering that the number of existing binational environmental
agreements in the world far surpasses that of multilateral ones
(2,296 vs. 1,344, according to the International Environmental
Agreements Database Project, https://iea.uoregon.edu), we expect
that empirical studies of binational fishery commissions will
contribute to the understanding of international environmental
treaties and their operations. After a brief description of study
methods, the following section assesses GLFC's influence using
survey data, complemented by the interview results that help
explain the comparatively high influence detected.
3.2. Survey description
We used an online survey tool (‘LimeSurvey’) to target civil
servants working in the public sector management of the Great
Lakes Fishery. Individuals were selected based on their affiliation
with the preselected organizations and their role related to fishery
governance. These included employees affiliated with state/pro-
vincial and federal agencies on both sides of the Canada-US border
as well as inter-governmental and tribal organizations. The names
and email addresses of the potential respondents within these or-
ganizations were identified from publicly accessible reports and
online documentation. They were contacted by email with an
invitation explaining the purpose of the survey and with a link to
the online survey instrument. A total of 45 organizations were
included in the study. They comprised binational organizations
such as the International Joint Commission and the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission, tribal organizations such as the Great Lakes
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, federal agencies such as
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Natural Resources Canada, the U.S.
Geological Survey and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and sub-
national entities including the Ontario Ministry of Environment
and Climate Change, and the Michigan Department of Natural Re-
sources (see Fig. 1 for a full agency list). Of these, most respondents
reported affiliations in agencies within the U.S. federal government
(18%), the Canadian federal government (13%), the U.S. states of
Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, New York, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illi-
nois, and Minnesota (46%), and the Ontario government (19%). A
small percentage of respondents (<4%) reported primary affiliation
with inter-state or binational organizations. Fewer than 2% of the
respondents were from members of tribal fishery organizations.
The surveywas conducted between October and November of 2015,
and resulted in 226 completed surveys. All responses were anon-
ymous with no names or other identifiable information collected
other than professional affiliation (see Song et al., 2019b for other
details of survey processes).
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A similar survey was also conducted in the context of the
binational Pacific Salmon Commission (see Temby et al., 2015), the
details and results of which are presented in Appendix to enable
comparison and provide additional insight to the internal validity
of the survey measures and external validity of the GLFC case study
results.
3.3. Survey analyses and results
3.3.1. Aggregate patterns of communication
To produce the overall display of network connectivity as
determined by the communicative patterns of the surveyed
agencies, first, the weighted frequencies of formal and informal
communication indicated by each respondent (i.e., 2 ¼ regularly,
1 ¼ occasionally, 0 ¼ never) were tallied.
For the 226 respondents who participated in the Great Lakes
survey, a total of 1828 formal and 1536 informal communication
linkages were reported. From this, both the agencies with which
each respondent was affiliated and with which she communicated
were noted and classified according to the jurisdiction to which the
agencies belong (with binational [not including the GLFC] indicated
as [BI] and tribal as [TR]). Summation of this dyadic data resulted in
a network configuration of 14 nodes, generating a 14  14 adja-
cency matrix. Important to emphasize is that it is not the number of
individual respondents that are being aggregated, but the
communication linkages reported by each respondent. Differently
put, what we are measuring is the reported communication with
target jurisdiction, not simply the volume of communication by the
respondent's home affiliation. Fig. 1 presents the distribution of
interjurisdictional communication in the form of density visuali-
zation using VOSviewer 1.6.0. Node colour denotes the level of
interjurisdictional communication reported for each jurisdiction
(i.e., the redder the colour, the greater frequency of communication
one node is associated with other jurisdictions). The distance be-
tween nodes indicates the intensity of relatedness, such that closely
located nodes imply a proportionally higher occurrence of
communication between them.
Fig. 1 displays the overall patterns of communication. Interest-
ingly, the patterns mimic the geographical layout of the region it-
self, with respondents in adjacent jurisdictions shown to
communicate most frequently with each other (i.e. indicated by
shorter distances between nodes). For the purpose of this paper, the
central placement of the GLFC among the multiple jurisdictions
comprising the regime is noteworthy. Despite the lower number of
reported communication linkages associated with the GLFC (549,
light yellow colour) compared to, for instance, US Federal (2,009),
Michigan (1,311), and Ontario (1,020), the communicative pattern
suggests a strategic position through which it can reach all actors in
the network. The government dominated communication patterns
shown in Fig. 1 are not surprising given that typically a greater
range of responsibilities and resources are at the disposal of federal
and state agencies compared to international treaty secretariats.
Still, what is striking is the centrality of the GLFC, implying strength
of relation with most other jurisdictions in the network and sub-
sequently a network-facilitating role (see van Eck and Waltman,
2010 for details of the mapping technique). This is especially so
considering the marginal positions of the Canadian federal and
Ontario agencies despite their role in managing four of the five
Great Lakes. Based on this result, it appears that the GLFC, along
with U.S. federal and Michigan, is playing the role of “hub” or
“broker” through which interjurisdictional communication is being
carried out. A similar finding that reveals the intermediate position
Fig. 1. Interjurisdictional communication pattern for governance networks pertaining to the Great Lakes fisheries.
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of a treaty secretariat was observed in the survey of the Pacific
Salmon Commission (see Appendix).
3.3.2. Estimating the size of influence
The survey results on interorganizational influence are pre-
sented in Table 1 and graphically in Fig. 2. They include scores for
the 15 (of the 45) organizations, who together represent 67% of all
interorganizational contact reported in the survey (that is, one third
of the organizations making up more than two thirds of the
communication linkages in the network). The specific percentage
for each organization is listed in the “percent communicating”
column. The four columns to the right of the percent communi-
cating column in Table 1 indicate the degree of influence derived
from the self-assessment of staff of other organizations for the or-
ganization listed in the row, as measured by the survey questions.
We show combined occasional and regular influence through
informal channels; regular influence through informal channels;
combined occasional and regular influence through formal chan-
nels; and regular influence through formal channels. For example,
70.6% of non-US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)-employed
respondents who report communicating with the USFWS indicated
being regularly or occasionally influenced by this organization
through informal means (0.706), while 81.9% of them reported
regular or occasional influence through formal means (0.819).
The survey results reveal that the GLFC, as represented by its
secretariat, had a strong influence over the fishery management
network. In terms of the percent communicating score, the GLFC
was only second to the USFWS, with 61.5% of the non-GLFC survey
participants reporting professional contact with the GLFC. Of
these respondents who claimed contact with the GLFC, 64% re-
ported occasionally or regularly basing their decisions on what
was being communicated informally with the GLFC; this number
rises to 81.3% when influence through formal communication is
measured. Thus, while the GLFC's influence facilitated through
informal communication was noteworthy (5th out of the 15 dis-
played), its influence through formal communication was
considerably higher in comparative terms (3rd out of the 15, see
Fig. 2). This suggests that the GLFC can be considered one of the
most influential organizations in the network of agencies gov-
erning the Great Lakes fishery, roughly equal to, if not more than,
Table 1
The Effects of Formal & Informal Communication in the Great Lakes (Note: Standard errors in parenthesis).














IOs International Joint Commission (IJC) .323 .384 (.057) .014 (.014) .493 (.059) .068 (.055)
Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) .615 .640 (.041) .173 (.032) .813 (.033) .338 (.040)
US
Federal
US Geological Survey (USGS) .553 .720 (.040) .184 (.035) .832 (.033) .248 (.039)
US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) .708 .706 (.036) .181 (.030) .819 (.030) .263 (.035)
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) .535 .471 (.045) .107 (.028) .686 (.042) .182 (.035)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) .381 .407 (.053) .070 (.028) .500 (.054) .140 (.037)
US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) .412 .398 (.051) .065 (.026) .667 (.049) .108 (.032)
Canada
Federal
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) .549 .613 (.044) .113 (.028) .710 (.041) .185 (.035)
Environment Canada (ENVCAN) .389 .511 (.053) .091 (.031) .636 (.051) .159 (.039)
US
Subnational
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MIDNR) .518 .650 (.044) .120 (.030) .769 (.039) .265 (.041)
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MNDNR) .336 .553 (.057) .079 (.031) .618 (.056) .092 (.033)
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) .389 .568 (.053) .205 (.043) .682 (.050) .250 (.046)
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (OHDNR) .336 .579 (.057) .105 (.035) .671 (.054) .224 (.048)
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WIDNR) .381 .605 (.053) .151 (.039) .547 (.054) .186 (.042)
Canada Subnational Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (OMNRF) .566 .680 (.041) .148 (.031) .805 (.035) .336 (.042)
Fig. 2. Agency communication with each other, and communication-facilitated influence in the Great Lakes fisheries policy network (*Occasional þ Regular Influence).
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the highly funded Canada or U.S. federal agencies. We note similar
findings for the Pacific Salmon Commission in another survey we
conducted in the context of transboundary Pacific salmon fish-
eries in western North America (see Appendix).
3.4. Understanding relational mechanisms of secretariat influence
To further probe the relational determinants of influence, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with twelve staff members
of the GLFC secretariat in December 2016. The interviewees’ roles
spanned diverse programs/expertise from fisheries coordination to
scientific research to policy and legislative affairs. While the survey
analysis above revealed the extent of GLFC influence judged
directly by the other organizations in the network, and displayed in
an aggregate format, the interviews sought a reflexive perspective
of how the GLFC secretariat itself perceives its role, how it may
exercise influence across the policy and management network, and
the strategies for doing so. Examples of the questions include:
- How much latitude does the GLFC secretariat have in inter-
preting its mandate? How does it operate in relation to gov-
ernment parties?
- To what extent does the GLFC create or define new tasks for
itself, potentially expanding its mandate? What is the process
for doing this?
- Are the GLFC secretariat's main functions and programs repli-
cated by any other international organizations or government
agencies? Or does it fulfill distinctive and non-substitutable
functions?
The questions were broadly inspired by the sources and de-
terminants of IO influence and power elaborated by Barnett and
Finnemore (2004) and Jinnah (2014). The interviews lasted 1 h on
average with the interviewees being assured of confidentiality. After-
wards, they were transcribed and coded, and thematic analysis tech-
niqueswere applied to elicit key narratives (i.e. Braun andClarke, 2006).
Three main traits were identified. First, among those inter-
viewed, there was a strong sense that the GLFC is uniquely bina-
tional and therefore irreplaceable. The fact that the GLFC has been
around for so long also seems to have contributed to its institu-
tionalized status, which made it difficult for interviewees to hy-
pothetically consider what would take its place if it did not exist.
Members of the secretariat commented:
There's dozens and dozens of projects that are directly influ-
encing fishery management, so if the commission isn't coordi-
nating this, who is? It falls apart because we are the only ones
that have that sort of international mandate, we can coordinate
across all of the boundaries across all of the jurisdictions.We can
deal with moving data, money, funding projects across bound-
aries, all of that. So, the answer is the commission is critical in
terms of that international oversight role… I think the basinwill
be completely different without the commission playing that
sort of coordinating international role. (Respondent #10)
You would probably backtrack by 50 or 60 years, with people
then creating alliances and trying to get their own e this [the
GLFC] is the mechanism that has been established and facili-
tated that conversation. (Respondent #7)
This view corroborates with Jinnah (2014) who argued that the
secretariats of IOs are more influential if they perform functions
that are not easily substitutable by another organization partici-
pating in a network governing a given issue. The other determinant
of secretariat influence in Jinnah's theory is whether secretariats
work on an issue onwhichmember government does not have firm
and solidified preferences. Great Lakes fishery management is a
well-established problem for which governments have dedicated
bureaucracies with a record of articulated preferences. In-
terviewees indicated that this narrows the scope of influence, and
that GLFC officials seek to appear facilitative rather than repre-
sentative of a particular position. Two of the interviewees sug-
gested that having regulatory authority (such as the ability to set
fishing quotas) would undermine its apparent impartiality and
make it less trusted by the other partners.
Second, the GLFC not only has access to relevant decision-
making forums in the basin-wide fisheries management network
and in the capital cities of the two countries; its unique binational
presence has facilitated information exchange and relationship-
building among the government agencies through a well-
attended meeting structure it created for the region. Identified as
a key source of influence for the GLFC (along with the ongoing
success of sea lamprey control), several secretariat staff spoke
extensively about the efficacy of these meetings:
We have Lake Committee meetings, we have annual meetings,
we have the biennial meetings. A lot of that are different
members at different levels, but the Council Lake Committees,
the Lake Committees, these are everyone coming together,
people who are influencers, people who are decision-makers,
heads of DNRs [Departments of Natural Resources], giving the
authority to make these decisions or at least giving the ability to
take that information back to their decision-makers. (Respon-
dent #7)
So, all of those meetings the structures had been in place for a
long time … And one of the things that astounded me when I
first got involved in this organization [the GFLC] back in the
early 2000's was the discipline with which people came to
meetings … You go to the Council of Lake Committees meeting
and a 100 percent of the time a 100 percent of the jurisdictions
are represented. And the same right up and down the whole,
you know, tree. So, you ask yourself the question, why is that? As
things get busier, you know as people's agendas fill up more and
more … teleconferencing has replaced face-to-face meetings …
it's easier to do things than it was before. Despite all of that,
people come to the meetings and they participate, they engage.
And so, when you think about it from that perspective, it's
because the stakes are high. If you don't participate in the
meetings within any of those layers, then you potentially miss
out on some pretty important decision-making about, you
know, anything to do with the management of the resource …
[T]hey can't afford not to participate. (Respondent #8)
This understanding of influence is markedly relational in the
sense that it only emerges and persists insofar as state agencies
decide to participate. Once the discipline with which other agencies
engage in the process is lost (i.e. “if people started to not show up”),
there is a recognition that the Commission will begin to be under-
mined, as one interviewee puts it: “So if you had two jurisdictions
that didn't come all of a sudden, the integrity of the whole thing
starts to get compromised.” (Respondent #8) Hence, the mainte-
nance of this convening power is a critical element of GLFC influence.
Third, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that IOs that are viewed
as legitimate by governments are more able to exercise influence
through the shaping of how issues are understood. In the case of the
GLFC, through the secretariat activity of creating, coordinating and
supporting the communicative structure across the entire network that
is basin-wide, it appears that the GLFC has acquired a crucial means of
shaping information and framing perceptions of the issues that affect
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other parties. In the words of the interviewees, this was described as:
People get to know people, relationships are built, there's
credibility. It's all brought about because of the way the com-
mission has structured the lake committees and helps facilitate
their interaction; people get to know each other very well and
that way you can lay the cards on the table and work together to
achieve the goals … (Respondent #11)
We [the GLFC secretariat] have the ability to shape some of the
thinking… becausewe tend to speak for the collective basin and
so, I think generally, the commission is viewed as being a
spokesperson for our partners for the other agencies … I don't
think it's this ability to control thinking, I think it's an ability to
share a broader perspective and a history of doing that that
provided us with a great deal of influence in directing some of
these policy or science. (Respondent #5)
4. Discussion and conclusions
By approaching influence as a relationally derived construct in a
network setting, this study devised and tested a survey that achieved
a quantitative assessment of treaty secretariat influence. In this way,
how influential is less a questionof resources atdisposal, themandate
of the secretariat, or its organizational cultures, but more directly
pertains to how government agencies, who typically possess regula-
tory authority as well as larger budget and personnel, regard the
secretariat as impactful. In other words, influence materializes to the
degree that other organizations in the governance network judge
their (internal) decision-making to be influenced by the work of the
secretariat. An application of the designed survey to the binational
Great Lakes Fishery Commission demonstrated a considerable degree
of influence exertedby the secretariate afindingessentially obtained
by the members of the policy network expressing so. The compara-
tively high level of influence of this treaty secretariat, together with
being the locus of interjurisdictional communication (a finding
replicated in the caseof thePacific SalmonCommission survey results
presented in Appendix) echoes a recent analysis of the global climate
governance structure wherein the secretariat of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is ranked “sixth” in terms
of the ability to influence the flow and content of policy-relevant
knowledge within its stakeholder network (Saerbeck et al., 2020).
Our result also corroborates previous findings based on qualitative
methods, supporting their observations of the unique capability of a
treaty secretariat in directing someof the policyor science (see Bauer,
2006; Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009; Busch, 2014; Jinnah, 2014;
Eckhard and Ege, 2016). This is an interesting and useful confirmation
given the expectation of secretariats to downplay their influence and
states’ reticence to formally acknowledge secretariat influence. Yet in
this case, elicitation of direct expression of influence was possible
through our survey method.
Probing deeper, through key informant interviews, our study
sought explanations of how this influence may come to be rela-
tionally derived. Findings from the GLFC secretariat suggest that a
major means through which a secretariat can generate and maintain
the control of the network, shape agendas, and intervene in regional
priorities, is through ensuring robust attendance in the meeting
structure it has convened and led for over half a century. The sys-
tematic meeting structures which strive to ensure participation of all
levels of regulatory bureaucracy has served as a source of authority
and legitimacy for the GLFC, as a member of the secretariat high-
lighted: “we have a combination of fiduciary and environmental
responsibility and social interactions that all form kind of a nexus…
It's a combination of collaboration, communication, coordination,
cooperation, all leading to something that looks like e well, it could
be expressed as influence, but that's one descriptive word of a much
bigger diamond that has lots of facets” (Respondent #9).
Two factors appear crucial in generating this outcome. One is
the legitimacy and ostensive impartiality derived from the GLFC's
long-proven ability to share a broader binational perspective. The
GLFC (both the secretariat and the commissioners) has built a
reputation of speaking and acting for the collective interests of the
Great Lakes basin, hence being viewed as something of a ‘spokes-
person’ for the common, interconnected fisheries issues. This is not
the authority to manage the fishery per se, but the authority to set
up working arrangements to bring about better transboundary
fisheries management. Subsequently, being in contact with the
GLFC has given individual agencies or jurisdictions a compelling
incentive to consider what other states or the entire region is doing
before deciding and taking on management actions. Hence, a long
history of credibility on the part of the treaty secretariat has likely
attracted significant body of listeners.
Another notable feature in the functioning of the Great Lakes
fishery governance network is the occurrence of affinitive trust (i.e.
a type of trust built on informality, familiarity and long-term in-
teractions) which is shown to enhance one's aptitude to influence
decision-making of others, as facilitated via communication (Song
et al., 2019b). As shown in Fig. 2, the GLFC is an agency with the
second highest proportion of communication linkages reported in
the network, suggesting its potential to be influential amid the
occurrence of trusting relationships among agencies (see also
Leonard et al., 2011; Mulvaney et al., 2015). Indeed, collegial or
personal relationships abound and are particularly valued in the
Great Lakes fishery regime, where its community of professionals is
likened to an epistemic community who “speak the same lan-
guage” (Gaden et al., 2013). As an entity relied upon by others to
coordinate these valued interactions, the GLFC is ‘on the front foot’
to shape information and perceptions of the issues, oversee diffu-
sion of norms as well as influence the broad policy agenda (sensu
Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Likewise, as detailed in Appendix,
the organization of the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) into a
committee and panel structure, which brings together government
managers, scientists, and representatives of fishing industry, com-
bined with the existence of long-standing relationships among the
participants, are noted to have similarly contributed to the effec-
tiveness of the PSC in managing multi-jurisdictional coordination
(McRae, 2010; Temby et al., 2015; Song et al., 2017).
What emerges from this study, therefore, is the salience of a
relational structure of a governance network and the cooperative
makeup of interactions built on mutual dependence and close re-
lationships, which provides a source of influence for those entrusted
to coordinate the exchanges. This is consistentwith the conclusions of
a general network scholarship which has shown network involve-
ment, or embeddedness in a network, is positively related to key
organizational outcomes such as trustworthiness, reputation and
influence (Provanet al., 2012). Ironically, the strengthof this approach
mayalso pose as a limitation, for relationally derived influencewould
require relationship-building as a prerequisite. For the GLFC (and the
PSC presented in Appendix), the backdrop of generally amicable
binational relations between Canada and the USA, along with the
perpetuation of the same language and similar culture, have all likely
made them easier to function this way. For a multilateral treaty that
draws together jurisdictions from different continents, histories,
languages and economic standards of living, however, an interna-
tional organization may undergo a more onerous process of engen-
dering interorganizational trust and recognized interdependence,
and thereforeofderivingnetworked influence. Thus, howand towhat
degree secretariat influence in the relational sense develops in a
multilateral setting with a more diverse range of actors represents a
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useful direction for future research.
Situating the findings of this study within the existing under-
standing of secretariat influence yields additional insights. As dis-
cussed above, Jinnah (2014)'s theory of IO secretariat influence
proposes two master variables explaining variation in influence,
namely, preference solidification and the substitutability of func-
tions. The fact that the multitude of challenges facing the Great
Lakes fishery have a more than century-long history suggests that
preferences on issues like fish stocking and harvesting limits would
be well-defined. In fact, in the 1960s, the GLFC would set fishing
quotas (although it did not have the formal authority to do so)
because no one else had sufficient knowledge. Now, the state
parties have quota preferences with which they come to the table.
Even the issue for which the GLFC was explicitly created to address,
the sea lamprey invasion, has amore than 70-year history. Thus, the
GLFC secretariat operates in the context of solidified preferences,
and Jinnah's theory would predict this to limit influence. The evi-
dence here suggests, however, that the secretariat has adapted to
steer policy more adeptly with its own institutional maturation.
With regard to the substitutability of functions, the GLFC sec-
retariat's facilitation of policy coordination is relevant. History has
shown that, in the absence of a coordinating organization, such as
the GLFC, there would be fragmented parochialism (Gaden et al.,
2013). The GLFC may perhaps be replaced by a more robust
Canada-US transnational network; however, considering the fact
that the GLFC is used even in the U.S. subnational context to co-
ordinate policy in state waters, it is probably hard to dispense with.
The alternative would be a working group without a treaty secre-
tariat, with state/provincial resources, doing the coordinating. But
given that the eight states and Ontario need to coordinate
ecosystem management and the stocking and fishing quota setting
of specific fish species, this does not seem realistic. Neither does
giving the task to the International Joint Commission or Great Lakes
Commission, each of which is not scaled appropriately and do not
have the knowledge the GLFC has. The GLFC secretariat performs
two other important functions on an ongoing basis. If the GLFC did
not do these, it would leave a void in leadership in this area. First,
for now, no other organization has the expertise to do sea lamprey
management. Because it involves canals and dams in subnational
waters and the coordinated chemical treatment of the lakes with
lampricide, it would require something that may end up looking a
lot like the GLFC. Second, the GLFC secretariat funds scientific
studies and commissions papers synthesizing the state of scientific
knowledge on a range of topics. This represents an important, yet
subtle, form of technocratic power. Without this work, less
knowledge of Great Lakes fisheries would be produced by scientists
and it would likely be more fragmented e in terms of not centrally
coordinated, and not centrally framed by way of synthesis reports.
There are certain limitations of our methodology. It is worth
noting that the depiction of a governance network as pursued in
this study is not perfect, given that the survey relied on re-
spondents' voluntary participation while based on non-
randomized, purposive sampling. What is attained is therefore a
partial picture of the ‘true’ communicative relations and interor-
ganizational influence in the regime. Nevertheless, because
capturing all organizations and every pertinent agency staff in the
data is often not a feasible strategy and because estimating the
structure of a network itself is one of the major aims of network-
based analysis, this constraint is grounded well within the gener-
ally implied caveat of network methodology (e.g. this also applies
to Twitter-generated network data, see J€orgens et al., 2016; Kolleck
et al., 2017). In addition, to show any changing trends of secretariat
influence over time, a longitudinal design that incorporates
multiple survey applications would be valuable.
Binational fishery commissions are a sub-continental organi-
zation focused on a specific natural resource basewith smaller staff,
budget and international reputation on offer. In the case of the
GLFC, while it enjoys low substitutability, it nevertheless operates
in areas of high preference solidification, meaning fishery chal-
lenges have existed for many decades for the national and subna-
tional governments to develop a set of preferences for how fisheries
should be managed. While such hypotheses may suggest sizable
hurdles to overcome for small treaty secretariats in generating in-
fluence over other government entities, an exploration of the
relational methodology above shows otherwise. Through
convening power developed over decades of trust-building effort
and the development of supporting management control mecha-
nisms, the ability of the GLFC secretariat to steer norms and ideas
and shape relationships across jurisdictional boundaries could be
demonstrated. The results contribute to the deepening pool of ev-
idence suggesting the high salience of IOs (of any size) in shaping
decision-making within cooperative environmental regimes.
Importantly, the relational approach is a useful research avenue
through which one can attempt to directly elucidate the degree and
reach of international treaty secretariat influence e an approach
that would benefit from further sharpening and empirical testing.
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APPENDIX
We also conducted a survey of the transboundary fishery policy
network governing Pacific salmon fisheries in western North
America. In what follows we summarize the results to offer a de-
gree of insight to the external validity and potential generalizability
of our Great Lakes survey findings to other treaty secretariats.
Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC)
The PSC was originally created in 1937 as the International Pa-
cific Salmon Fisheries Commission and has existed in its current
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form since the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty. Its main purpose is to
advise on the conservation of the Pacific salmon to achieve opti-
mum production and fair harvest allocation. The 1999 Canada-US
Pacific Salmon Agreement (and subsequently the 2008 Agreement)
amended the 1985 treaty by improving the PSC’s process of
measuring stock abundance and setting commercial and recrea-
tional fishing quotas (Miller 2003). The management of the Pacific
salmon is a complex and politically sensitive endeavor owing to the
numerous biologically distinct fish stocks traveling through inland
rivers and ocean basins, across national and state borders, and
through multiple governance regimes (Ebbin, 2002). The organi-
zation is advised by five panels (Northern, Southern, Trans-
boundary, Fraser River and Yukon River), each of which manages a
specific region and submits quota recommendations to a group of
commissioners appointed by Canada and the US, who then review
and forward the negotiated plans to the governments for final
approval and regulatory implementation, or, in the case of the
Yukon River Panel, directly to the two governments (Miller, 2003).
Uniquely, the Fraser River Panel engages in the in-season regulation
of Fraser River-origin sockeye and pink salmon fisheries within its
designated area including the decisions to open or close the fishery.
Several joint technical committees support the overall process by
reporting relevant scientific information to the panels and com-
missioners. The secretariat, located in Vancouver, perform a variety
of functions, such as running field programs, facilitating meetings,
preparing reports and providing technical information and scien-
tific advice on stock assessment, fish biology and hydroacoustics
among others (PSC, 2016).
Survey description
The Pacific salmon data were collected during September and
October 2013, and consists of 92 complete survey responses. For
this survey, we restricted data to the region represented by the
Northern Panel of the PSC. All responses were anonymous with no
names or other identifiable information collected other than
professional affiliation (see [masked for blind review] for other
details of survey processes).
We identified 30 organizations as relevant public agencies that
potentially formed the Pacific salmon fisheries governance
network. They included Pacific Salmon Commission, US National
Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (see Figure A.1 for a
full list of agencies included in the survey). The preponderance of
its respondents was from agencies belonging to the US federal
government (20%), the Canadian federal government (16%), the
state of Alaska (29%), and the Canadian province/territory of British
Columbia and Yukon (30%).
Survey analyses and results
Aggregate patterns of communication
For the 92 respondents who participated in the Pacific salmon
study, a total of 388 formal and 350 informal communication
dyadic linkages were reported. From this, both the agencies with
which each respondent was affiliated and with which she
communicated were noted and classified according to the
jurisdiction to which the agencies belong. We used four juris-
dictional groupings (US Federal, Alaska, Canadian Federal, Ca-
nadian province/territory) for enhanced analytical clarity, plus
the PSC and non-state actors. Having included 6 groupings
meant that a 66 adjacency matrix was used to create the
interjurisdictional communication network (i.e., 6 nodes).
Figure A1 presents the distribution of interjurisdictional
communication in the form of density visualization using VOS-
viewer 1.6.0. Node colour denotes the level of interjurisdictional
communication reported for each jurisdiction (i.e., the redder
the colour, the greater frequency of communication one node is
associated with other jurisdictions). The distance between
nodes indicates the intensity of relatedness such that closely
located nodes imply a proportionally higher occurrence of
communication between them.
Fig. A.1. Interjurisdictional communication pattern for governance networks pertaining to the Northern Panel of the Pacific salmon fisheries.
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As suggested by the node colour, communication is concen-
trated at, and between, the US Federal and the Alaska state agencies
(i.e., 341 and 329 units of communication, respectively), and on the
Canadian side, at and between the Canada Federal and the Prov-
ince/Territory agencies (330 and 321). Meanwhile, markedly fewer
communication linkages were associated with the PSC (85). Such
patterns are not surprising given the typically a greater range of
responsibilities and resources that are at disposal with federal and
state agencies compared to international treaty secretariats. What
is strikingly depicted in this result, however, is the centrality of PSC
(as well as the non-state actors), implying its network-facilitating
role in the way the PSC communicates with the federal and sub-
national management bodies.
Estimating the size of influence
The survey results on interorganizational influence are pre-
sented in Table A.1 and graphically in Figure A.2. Of the 30 or-
ganizations included in the Pacific salmon survey as choices for
respondents to report communicating with, we focused on the
top 10 organizations with the highest frequency. These organi-
zations represented more than two thirds of all interorganiza-
tional contact reported in the survey. The calculation and
interpretation of the figure and table are the same as for Table 1
and Figure 2 in main body of the manuscript. For example, 51.5%
of non- US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) employees re-
ported communicating with USFWS. Of these, 64.7% indicated
being regularly or occasionally influenced by this organization
through informal means (0.647), while 80.1% of them reported
regular or occasional influence though formal means (0.801).
The PSC has the same percentage of respondents in the
network communicating with it as NOAA (which regulates fish-
ing in US federal waters) and more than any British Columbia
government agency (39.4%). Only four organizations are
communicated with more, and three of these are highly funded
regulatory agencies. Of the respondents that reported commu-
nicating with the PSC, 53.8% reported influence through informal
means, and 69.2% reported being influenced through formal
means. The influence of the PSC facilitated through informal
communication, such as phone calls, chance conversation and
social interactions was not remarkable. However, the influence of
the PSC determined through formal communication channels
that include committee meetings and official memo was rela-
tively high, equivalent to that of national agencies such as Fish-
eries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and US Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) and even surpassing that of Alaska Department
of Fish and Game (ADFG). The overall portrait is of the Northern
Panel of PSC that is roughly or nearly equal in influence to the
national and sub-national public agencies governing the trans-
boundary Pacific salmon in southeast Alaska and northern British
Columbia.
Table A.1
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